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I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 1986, after an absence of over forty years, China
officially applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).1 The government's motivations in doing so were
complex. One important reason was the desire of the leadership
for the enhanced international stature that GATT membership
would give China.2 After all, the GATT was virtually the only
remaining major international organization of which China was
not a member following its reentry into the world community in
the 1970s. Another reason was, of course, the expected boost in
export earnings that would come with access to a bigger mar-
ket.' Finally, in the eyes of many policy makers, GATT mem-
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT]. A great deal of ink has been spilled over the issue of whether
China is joining the GATT as a new member or resuming a lapsed membership. China
has always argued that because the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan was not the true
government of China when it cabled its withdrawal from the GATT in 1950, the
withdrawal was therefore invalid and China is still a member. The issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, but is addressed in an excellent article by Ya Qin. She points out
the logical fallacy of assuming that China could not lose its membership in any way
other than the Kuomintang government's act. For over 30 years, the government of the
People's Republic of China and the GATT contracting parties all assumed that China
was not a member and acted accordingly. Although China neither gave nor received
trade benefits under the GAT', no complaints were ever made against it or by it under
GATT procedures. See generally Ya Qin, China and GATT: Accession Instead of
Resumption, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 77 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Qisi Ge, Conducting Business in Accordance with International Rules
and Regulations in Foreign Economic and Trade Endeavors-On Restoring China's
Signatory Status at the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [sic], RENMIN RIBAO
[PEoPLE's DAILY], Nov. 23, 1992, at 5, translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST INIO. SERVICE,
DAILY REPORT: CHINA, No. 92-232, Dec. 2, 1992, at 37.
3. See, e.g., Xiaodi Zhao, A New Task for Participating in International Economic
Competition-A Brief Analysis of Joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
RENMIN RiBAo [PEOPLE's DAILY], Sept. 4, 1992, at 5, translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFO. SERVICE, DAILY REPORT: CHINA, No. 92-181, Sept. 17, 1992, at 26, 27.
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bership was an important element of China's domestic economic
reform.4
China's application has been difficult for the GATT parties
to handle for several reasons. On the one hand, China is a
major trading nation, ranking just below the top ten.5 Around
eighty-five percent of China's foreign trade is conducted with
the GATT member nations.6 On the other hand, China's eco-
nomic, legal, and political institutions simply do not operate the
way the GATT contemplates a country's economic, legal, and
political institutions will operate. Variance from GATT norms
was not a problem with the occasional small nonmarket econo-
mies like Romania or Poland, which could be let into the GATT
primarily for Cold War reasons without any fear of disruption of
the system.7 But it is ironically China's presence in interna-
tional markets which, while seeming to make it a natural candi-
date for membership, at the same time makes the current
GATT members very nervous about its potential for disruption.
This Article will explore some of the conflicts between the
premises of the GATT and China's current economic, legal, and
political structure, as well as the extent to which China's insti-
tutions are moving in a GATT-compatible direction. It will con-
clude that while GATT membership would in itself promote the
reforms that would make China's institutions more compatible
with the GATT, such reforms are the object of considerable
domestic opposition.
I. FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES OF GATT
The rules of the GATT were formulated with a particular
politico-economic structure in mind and make sense only in the
context of that structure.
A. Market Economy
First, the GATT assumes the existence of a market econ-
omy with some basic features. Decisions on buying and selling
are assumed to be made by decentralized profit-maximizing
actors with a hard budget constraint.8 The role of government
4. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
5. See Ge, supra note 2, at 35.
6. See James V. Feinerman, The Quest for GATT Membership, CHINA Bus. REV.,
May-June 1992, at 24, 25; Zhao, supra note 3, at 26.
7. T.K. Chang, After China Joins the GATT: Will It Continue to Face Annual MFN
Renewal Battles?, E. AsLAN ExEc. REP., Mar. 1993, at 9, 10-11.
8. On hard and soft budget constraints, see infra part III.A.1.
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is to set the rules and act as a referee to ensure fairness. Trade
barriers should be in the form of tariffs, which are visible and
whose costs can be calculated according to market principles.9
The GATT shies away from numerical quotas and makes
tariffs the preferred form of trade barrier not just because tar-
iffs are more visible than other barriers and hence easier for
those adversely affected to identify and lobby against. Tariffs
are also the form of trade barrier that minimizes government
interference and maximizes the autonomy of private market
actors. Each importer can make for itself the decision whether
it is worth it to import even at the higher tariff. There is no
room for the corruption and favoritism that invariably accom-
pany the granting of import licenses for less than market price.
The GATT aims for the reduction of trade barriers and the
promotion of trade primarily through what we might call proce-
dural guarantees. It does not require governments to increase
imports; it attempts to promote a structure that will maximize
the possibility of that happening. Thus, the GATT prefers tar-
iffs to quotas because the harm is more obvious. This prefer-
ence is also premised on the assumption that the lower tariffs
are, the more imports will be bought because individual profit-
maximizing buyers with a hard budget constraint will have an
incentive to buy more as the price goes down, all other things
being equal.
B. Rule of Law
Second, the GATT assumes that a country's political struc-
ture involves a government limited by law and a certain degree
of separation of powers. Thus, for example, Article XIV specifi-
cally contemplates that signatory governments may not have
the power to make subnational levels of government abide by
GATT provisions. 10 Similarly, the prevailing interpretation of
paragraph 1(b) of the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application"
limits the scope of "existing legislation" to requirements on the
executive authority that cannot be modified by executive
9. For a brief introduction to tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade, see JOHN H.
JACKSON & WILLiAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 364-69 (2d ed. 1986).
10. GATT, supra note 1, at A43, 55 U.N.T.S. at 240. Important economic powers
may, for example, be granted by a constitution to subnational levels of government such
as provinces or states.
11. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
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action,'2 clearly assuming that such requirements might actu-
ally exist.
C. Open Society
Third, the GATT presumes that member states are more or
less open societies. It assumes a certain degree of, and strives
to increase, transparency in law making and law enforcement.
States could hardly object to trade barriers and seek their
removal if the barriers were secret-for example, if the govern-
ment sent secret directives to the managers of state-owned
firms telling them to reduce imports of steel by fifty percent.
III. PROBLEM AREAS FOR CHINA AND THE GATT
What are the problems of trying to fit China into this sys-
tem? As a threshold question, one must ask whether conform-
ity to GATT norms matters. Clearly, the domestic systems of
Poland and Romania did not square with many of the assump-
tions of the GATT when they were admitted, and yet that was
not considered an insuperable obstacle.
Even so, the admission of certain nonmarket economies is
explainable by considerations that do not apply to China. First,
their admission cannot be viewed apart from a Cold War strat-
egy of trying to detach them from Soviet influence. Second,
their small size meant that even though they did not operate
according to GATT principles, they posed no threat of disrup-
tion to the global trading order. Moreover, GATT signatories
did extract a numerical promise from Poland, for example,
regarding import quantities.
China presents a much bigger problem than Poland or
Romania because any unwanted effects of its GATT-incompati-
ble polity will be magnified through its prominence in interna-
tional trade.
A. Market Economy
China's political and economic structure confounds the
GATT ideal in many ways. It is not just a question of the exist-
ence of economic planning; indeed, the value of production
under the state mandatory plan dropped from 12% of total pro-
12. See Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GATT Panel Report
(June 22, 1989), in BAsIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 320 (36th Supp.
1990).
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duction in 1992 to 6.5% in 1993,13 and approximately 90% of
annual retail sales are made on the free market. 14 The problem
is rooted in the fact that enterprises often serve a number of
purposes, only one of which is the accumulation of profits. Con-
sequently, enterprises do not necessarily act the way profit-
maximizing actors do in economic models.
1. Soft Budget Constraint
First, many (although progressively fewer) of China's
enterprises are relatively insensitive to the market signals that
the GATT assumes will affect business behavior because they
lack a hard budget constraint.' 5 Enterprises lack a hard budget
constraint when the decisive factor in their existence is not the
difference between proceeds of production and costs of produc-
tion, but whether they can get more infusions of money from the
government. Costs are not as important as they would be to
purely market-driven firms because these enterprises-like
publicly regulated utilities in this country-can use increased
costs as a basis for a plea for more money. Insensitivity to the
difference between revenues and costs is another way of saying
insensitivity to market signals.
13. New Deregulation Measures: State Production Quotas Cut; Controlled Exports
Fewer, New China News Agency, Aug. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
XINHUA File.
14. Wu Xiao, China: Free Markets Account for 90% of All Sales, Bus. W, CHINA
DAILY Supp., Oct. 3, 1993, auailable Lin LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File. It should
be noted that statistics comparing quantities under the state mandatory plan with
quantities under the market tend to understate the importance of the plan. This is
because the only way to get an aggregate figure for nonidentical goods is to use prices
(e.g., four apples at 50 cents each plus six oranges at 40 cents each yield total sales of
$4.40). Plan prices are typically lower than market prices. Thus, in an economy whose
sole production is apples, if half were sold under the plan at 25 cents each and half were
sold on the free market at 50 cents each, the use of prices would yield the misleading
conclusion that two thirds of retail sales events were on the free market, when in fact
only half were.
15. The concept of soft and hard budget constraints in socialist enterprises was
developed most prominently by the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai. See generally
JANOS KORNA, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE (1980). In a firm with a hard budget
constraint, the difference between proceeds of production and costs of production is a
matter of life and death for the firm. In a firm with a soft budget constraint-for
example, a firm whose management knows it will be bailed out by government in the
event of insolvency-it is not. Id. at 302-14. Therefore, the difference does not act as an
effective constraint on firm behavior. The standard assumptions of microeconomics-
for example, that as the cost of an input rises, a firm will use less of it-do not
necessarily hold. For a further discussion of soft budget constraints in the Chinese
economy, see Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and
Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 9-13 (1991).
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Large state enterprises in China have historically had a
soft budget constraint. They served not only economic pur-
poses, but also political and social purposes. Not only did they
generate income for the government through their profits, but
they were a locus for the distribution of rewards and sanctions
to the urban population. Citizens who performed some service
for the state-for example, giving blood or turning out for gov-
ernment-organized demonstrations-were rewarded through
their work unit, even though the service was of no business ben-
efit to the enterprise. Therefore, if an enterprise showed a loss
on its books, it was not necessarily due to poor management or
bad market conditions. To judge an enterprise solely by its bot-
tom line would have been absurd because the enterprise was
not intended to be exclusively concerned with profit. The enter-
prise could always argue for a subsidy, and the state would
have to give it or face the prospect of workers being laid off or
going unpaid. When enterprise managers know that a subsidy
may be forthcoming, they are bound to be less concerned about
costs than managers who know that they will suffer from losses
whether or not they are at fault.
The result of the soft budget constraint is that contrary to
the expectations of the GATT, purchases of imports will not nec-
essarily increase as much as they otherwise might as tariffs,
and thus prices, fall. Many purchasers have other concerns
beyond price and quality.
This is particularly difficult for the GATT structure to han-
dle because the GATT, presuming a market order, allows firms
to do things it will not allow governments to do. For example, if
William Gates decides that Microsoft will henceforth use only
American-made computers at its headquarters, there is no
GATT violation. The GATTl presumes that as long as there is
no government-imposed protectionism, the economic irrational-
ity of such an act will prevent its occurrence on a large scale.
But where some government body relatively unconcerned with
the bottom line is the owner, it can decide as owner to do things
it could not, under the GATT, order the firms to do or, as a gov-
ernment, do itself.
Thus, while the Chinese government can assert that it
imposes no local content requirement on joint ventures as a
matter of law, joint venture contracts often do contain clauses
regarding export performance and local content sourcing. It is
clear that there could be a need to bind parties to buy locally
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only if it did not already make economic sense. Who, then, is
insisting on putting into the contract a provision that will
decrease the profitability of the joint venture? Clearly it is the
government (probably local) wearing its owner hat when it
negotiates a joint venture with a foreign partner.
2. Subsidies
Second, subsidies are pervasive in the Chinese economy
and will continue to be so, barring a major restructuring of gov-
ernment. Year after year the government announces its deter-
mination to make enterprises solely responsible for their profits
and losses, and yet the policy seems impossible to implement.
At present, state-owned enterprises have to perform social
functions for which they may be compensated through subsi-
dies. These subsidies do more than simply confound expecta-
tions about firm behavior through their softening of the budget
constraint. They may operate directly or indirectly to increase
exports or reduce imports, and to this extent are disfavored by
the GATT.
The GATT would prefer social functions to be undertaken
by the government, with enterprises doing just business. But
for China this is more than a question of just changing the
direction of the flow of money. The elimination of subsidies
would mean organizing society along fundamentally different
principles. Social control and significant distribution of welfare
benefits have traditionally taken place through the workplace.
It is no small change to alter that system completely.
Because of the concentration of public functions in enter-
prises, any change in the system of subsidies will ripple
throughout society. For example, the watchdogs of the Party's
interests, the enterprise Party secretary and his or her staff, are
traditionally paid from enterprise funds. But enterprises that
are supposed to pay attention to the bottom line cannot afford to
have nonproductive personnel on their payroll. In the absence
of subsidies, the locus of urban social control will have to shift
from the workplace to some other basis-probably the place of
residence.16 But who is going to pay the watchdogs in that
16. A particularly striking example of this shift is contained in a report of the steps
undertaken by Shanghai Petrochemical prior to its listing on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. In addition to transferring to local government the usual laundry list of
hospitals, schools, and other miscellaneous social functions, the company also divested
itself of a court and a police department. See Andrew Quinn, Huge China Share
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case? Neighborhood committees simply do not have the kind of
money that is needed to maintain Party secretaries in the style
to which they are accustomed, and the state is not administra-
tively strong enough simply to shift the money that would be
saved by enterprises over to neighborhood committees.
3. Ownership Structure
Third, although a large number of firms in the economy are
owned by units of government at some level, ownership struc-
ture is not a major problem in itself. The issue of state owner-
ship versus privatization is a red herring, and true private
ownership has in fact played only a small role in China's dra-
matic recent economic growth.
One of the key elements of China's industrial reform is the
much-vaunted separation of ownership and management.
According to proponents, the problem with the traditional
planned economy was that ownership was not separated from
control: both were vested in the state. The result was excessive
state interference in the operations of the enterprise. Because
it is ideologically necessary to keep ownership in the hands of
the state, the solution must be to separate ownership from
control.
The shortcoming of this theory is that it fails to understand
that ownership was always separated from control and that this
separation is a problem, not a solution. Ownership was vested
in an abstraction, the state. Investment funds came from a
treasury that was the private property of nobody. Control, on
the other hand, was necessarily vested in the hands of living
individuals. Because the state is an abstract entity, not a per-
son, it must necessarily act through human agents. Thus, there
is always a principal-agent problem when the state is a princi-
pal. The agents will always have an incentive to use the princi-
pal's property for their own benefit.
In determining the GATT-compatibility of China's indus-
trial structure, the real question is not ownership structure, but
what sort of incentives managers face. There is no reason in
principle why managers of state-owned firms cannot be induced
to maximize profits to the same extent as managers of large
publicly held corporations in the West. Neither have enough
personal wealth to be significant stockholders; both need some
Offering Swathed in Secrecy, REUTER LIB. REP., July 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, LBYRPT File.
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sort of supervision to ensure that they manage corporate wealth
prudently. When managers of Chinese firms face incentives
that reward cost cutting and profitability, they will cut costs
and seek profits. Who owns the enterprise is irrelevant to their
behavior except where the manager is also the owner, in which
case no supervisory mechanism is necessary.
This principle of management behavior is borne out by sta-
tistics on industrial output. The statistics show that the perva-
sive image of large state-owned enterprises as lumbering
dinosaurs doomed to extinction is erroneous. The power of this
image is reflected in a recent article that, while noting that
about half of industrial output still came from large state enter-
prises (as it has for several years), claimed that small township
and village enterprises were the driving force of growth.' 7 But
if large state enterprises have maintained a half share of output
while the overall total has grown, then clearly they are respon-
sible for half of the growth and their role should not be
neglected. Thus, some state-owned enterprises have plainly
been able to put in place a system of incentives that makes
managers pursue growth.
Additionally, the township and village enterprises that
have played an important role in economic growth are, with
rare exceptions, essentially organizations run by some level of
local government. Whether at the level of the large enterprise
or at the level of the small village enterprise, true private prop-
erty has played a very small role in China's recent development.
Somehow, the inherent principal-agent problems have been
solved at least to the extent that self-enrichment by managers
is not at the expense of significant growth."1
4. Pervasive Role of Government
Fourth, although genuine competition can exist among
firms that are formally designated "state-owned," a key element
of a market economy-business organizations entirely
independent of the state-is virtually prohibited in China.
Radical changes in the Chinese system of government would be
needed to create this element.
17. See Alexander Nicoll, Long March to Market, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 14.
18. Barry Naughton, What Is Distinctive About China's Economic Reform? State
Enterprise Reform and Overall System Transformation, J. COMP. EcoN. (forthcoming
1994).
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Any organization of any importance in China can exist only
with the approval of the government and must have its leader-
ship vetted, if not actually appointed, through the Communist
Party's personnel system. (This is true even of the so-called
"democratic parties" that the Communist Party permits to
exist.)
When the state formally withdraws from various kinds of
market manipulation to meet GATT requirements, its formal
control may be replaced by the same kind of manipulation
under another guise. For example, one article in the Chinese
press notes that entry into the GATT will require the govern-
ment to reduce its direct intervention in foreign trade. But it
adds that
[i]t is necessary to consider as soon as possible some way to
harmonize enterprises' foreign relations and avoid Chinese
enterprises "fighting against each other" on the world mar-
ket. The practice of harmonizing enterprises' foreign rela-
tions, importing technologies, and fixing prices of imports and
exports by non-governmental commercial chambers and
associations will be acceptable to GATT.19
It must be recognized that these so-called nongovernmental
organizations will be no more nongovernmental than the Chi-
nese Olympic Committee.
5. Local Protectionism
Fifth, it will be difficult for the central government to make
good on promises to open markets to foreign goods when it is
hard pressed to reduce local protectionist barriers against
domestically produced goods.
Out of their own interests, some localities erect checkpoints
everywhere, thus artificially putting up market barriers. On
the one hand, they exclude excess products from other locali-
ties from their own markets, and on the other hand, they
check the outflow of local resources to other localities and try
their best to protect their enterprises and markets. They
adopt almost all-embracing measures, ranging from applying
"economic levers" like taxation and finance, imposing heavy
levies on the operation of products from outside, increasing
loan interest, delaying or withholding payment for goods, and
favoring their own products. Some localities employ indus-
trial, commercial, and transportation departments, and even
19. Zhao, supra note 3, at 28.
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public security organs, procuratorial organs, and people's
courts to erect endless checkpoints and wantonly collect fees
and fines, thus hampering the normal flow of commodities as
well as goods and materials.... The State Council has issued
repeated injunctions demanding the removal of checkpoints
and the smoothing out of circulation channels, but actually
they were not strictly enforced and while visible checkpoints
were removed, invisible ones remained.2 °
While the central government undoubtedly has the formal
power to abolish local protectionist measures, its orders are
often ignored with impunity by local authorities. Because the
central government may simply be unable to dismantle local
barriers, yet unwilling to admit its powerlessness to foreigners,
these barriers may be a substantial irritant in China's relations
with its trading partners under the GATT.
Many of the issues involved in establishing a GATT-com-
patible economic order in China can be summed up by a para-
dox: because of the weakness and inefficacy of market-based
procompetitive measures, such as lowering tariffs or abolishing
quotas, the most effective method for the central government to
establish a market order is the administrative command. In
other words, to get rid of local protectionism, it will not be
enough for the central government to order local governments
to abolish their trade barriers. The legal system, as a system
for the decentralized enforcement of rules, is not strong enough
to do the job. To get real results, the central government will
have to resort to the method it always uses when faced with
resistance or apathy from below, whether in anticrime cam-
paigns or in economic policy: the numerical quota. It will have
to say to local authorities, "You must import X amount."
B. Rule of Law
The GATT assumes that signatory states are essentially
law governed. That is, it assumes that the power of a govern-
ment is generally limited to what it has been given through
some legitimate process. But in any realistic view of Chinese
law, there is no such thing as limits on executive action. The
idea of limited powers is wholly inconsistent with the philoso-
phy of Chinese government.
20. Article Urges Elimination of Local Protectionism, FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Sept. 21, 1992, at 4, translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE, DAILY
REPORT: CHINA, No. 92-187, Sept. 25, 1992, at 43-44.
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Indeed, it would not be too much to say that in China there
is no such thing as law binding on government. The very notion
of what it means to comply with a rule is different from that
assumed by the GATT, especially when governmental bodies
are involved. Essentially, the most that is required is a good
faith effort to comply, with due regard given to surrounding cir-
cumstances. Thus, for example, local governments for several
years openly violated the constitutional rule against the leasing
of land with the blessing of the central government, on the
grounds that local experimentation was needed before constitu-
tional revision was appropriate. Similarly, the government con-
tinues to allow violations of the provision of the Organic Law on
People's Courts calling for public trials, on the grounds that
many courts still do not have a proper courtroom in which to
hold the trials.
Because the GATT contemplates that trade disputes will
often be resolved through the passage or repeal of legislation,
this differing notion of rule compliance and of the binding effect
of legislated rules on government carries within it the seeds of
conflict.
C. Open Society
One of the most difficult problems to overcome in China's
accession to the GATT will be the problem of transparency.
Transparency-the principle that regulations and the processes
under which they are formulated and enforced should be open
and publicly available-is crucially important to the way the
GATT operates. In many cases, the GATT declines to make a
substantive rule, but instead endeavors to establish a process
by which states will resolve their disputes.2 ' In China, how-
ever, the operation of the legal system and the legislative pro-
cess are in principle state secrets, with details released only on
a need-to-know basis.
This principle is manifested in a number of ways. Attend-
ance at court proceedings, whether civil or criminal, is possible
only with the permission of the court. Permission is by no
means routine and needs some special justification. In the case
of foreigners, a Supreme People's Court directive states that for-
21. Article XIX, for example, allows a state to act to restrict imports on an
emergency basis when in its own judgment the imports threaten serious injury to
domestic producers, but at the same time requires that notice in writing of such action
be given to the GATT signatories. GATT, supra note 1, at A58, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258.
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eigners may in special cases be allowed to attend trials, but
takes pains to specify that foreigners may not be allowed to
attend any trial that they particularly ask to see.22
The publication of transcripts of court proceedings is
unlawful without the permission of the government. For exam-
ple, Liu Qing was sentenced to three years in prison in 1979 for
having distributed a transcript of the trial of Wei Jingsheng, a
dissident of the Democracy Wall era.23
The legislative process is similarly opaque. It is unlawful
to publish statutory collections without the permission of the
government.24 Even legislation that will be public when passed
is a state secret while it remains in draft form, and its circula-
tion outside authorized channels is forbidden. Occasionally, as
with the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the government may seek
the advice of foreigners before a law is passed or make prelimi-
nary drafts public for other reasons, but this is rare. An early
draft of the Foreign Trade Law was apparently made available
to the GATT Working Party on China, but was never, to my
knowledge, openly published in China until its formal passage
and promulgation in May 1994.
A great deal of rulemaking remains secret. The Chinese
government has promised in its 1992 memorandum of under-
standing with the United States and in its undertakings to the
GATT Working Party that all trade-related legislation will be
made public.25 Even with the best intentions, the government
will find this promise difficult to fulfill simply because it goes so
much against the grain of the way the legal system operates.
Foreign trade is not governed by laws enforced by courts in open
proceedings. It is governed by rules formulated by various con-
22. See Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan gongkai shenpan fei shewai
anjian shi fou zhunxu waiguoren pangting huozhe caifang wenti de pifu [Reply of the
Supreme People's Court on the Question of Whether Foreigners May Be Permitted to
Attend Public Trials of Cases Not Concerning Foreign Interests] (July 5, 1982), in
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHECUO FALIO GUIFANXING JIESHI JICHENG [COLLECTED
NoRMATrvE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (1990).
The very book in which this regulation is published is not intended for circulation to the
general public.
23. See Richard Bernstein, Human Rights in China: A Journey of Conscience, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, § 6, at 23.
24. See Fagui huibian bianji chuban guanli guiding [Rules on the Administration of
the Compilation and Publication of Statutory Collections] (July 29, 1990), in ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAGUI HUIBIAN [COLLECTED LAws AND STATUTES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 237 (1990).
25. See Susan MacCormac, Eyeing the GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar. 1993, at 34.
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cerned bureaucracies and implemented through the everyday
acts of those bureaucracies.
These features are not merely accidental incidents of the
legal system. They go to its basic organizing principles. China's
legal order is essentially entirely administrative. Most laws
and regulations are best characterized as commands running
down a bureaucratic hierarchy from superiors to inferiors.
Laws and regulations that cannot be so characterized are often
ineffective precisely because they are alien to the system. As a
result, laws and regulations passed by legislative bodies are
rarely very meaningful except as policy statements. The real
rules according to which government departments operate are
found in the regulations promulgated by and within those
departments.
Once we focus on the internal organization of a government
bureaucracy, it is clear that many of its procedures could legiti-
mately remain confidential. Nobody could reasonably expect
the Internal Revenue Service, for example, to publish the crite-
ria by which it identifies suspicious tax returns.
Because of these features of the Chinese legal system, it
will be very difficult for GATT parties to supervise the imple-
mentation of GATT norms within it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many of the problems that I have outlined are not unique to
China. Many countries have legal systems in which what
appears on paper does not correspond with what happens in
reality. What makes China's problems somewhat special is that
the closed nature of the system and the wide scope of executive
discretion are essential parts of the organizing principles of its
legal system. They will not easily change simply because they
are contrary to the basic assumptions of the GATT.
Indeed, the incompatibility of much of China's politico-eco-
nomic structure with GATT principles is precisely why China's
membership is strongly supported by domestic reformers. Their
principal concern is not trade at all; it is to use the GATT as a
stalking horse to dismantle the institutions that they feel stand
in the way of domestic reform.
As one commentator argued, once China joins the GATT,
the market mechanism will touch the deep-level defects of the
planned economy that have never been touched by reforms in
our country.
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... [The GATT's] impact on the current structure will not
be limited only to stimulating enterprises to acquire dyna-
mism. The high efficiency is accompanied by the disappear-
ance of the planning and approval-giving organs, the closure
of enterprises failing to adapt themselves to the new environ-
ment, and the equal opportunities of selecting jobs and being
selected for workers.26
Despite the hopes of reformers, it would be naive to suppose
that domestic opposition to reform measures will cease once
China becomes committed to reforms through GATT member-
ship. There is still a long way to go before China's domestic
institutions operate in anything like the manner that the GATT
presumes they will.
26. Yue Wu, Multilateral Rules and Market Economy-First Thought on China's
Readmission to the GATT, GuomI SHANGBAO [INTERNATIONAL Busw ss NEws], Sept. 6,
1992, at 1, translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE, DAILY REPORT: CHINA, No.
92-184, Sept. 22, 1992, at 42, 43.
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